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SECTION 453: INSTALLMENT SALES INVOLVING
RELATED PARTIES OR TRUSTS
John L. Ruppert*
Section 453 installment sales reporting has been a viable concept
in the Internal Revenue Code for fifty-three years. Despite this
long history, however, confusion still exists regarding the applica-
tion of section 453. In this article, the author explores the current
law concerning installment sales involving related parties or trusts.
He then examines legislation that recently was proposed by Con-
gress as a response to years of judicial inconsistency in this area.
Section 453 of the Internal Revenue Code' embodies the congressional
recognition of one simple concept: taxpayers, regardless of their accounting
method, should be permitted to return gain from the sale of property for
deferred payment obligations as those obligations are satisfied rather than
when the obligations are received. This concept has endured throughout
each of the modifications of section 453 since its first appearance in the tax-
ing statutes in the form of section 212(d) of the Revenue Act of 1926.2
Despite both its fifty-three year history and the simplicity of its purpose, the
exact parameters of section 453 remain unclear.
The past two decades have witnessed repeated taxpayer attempts to obtain
the benefits of section 453 while minimizing the economic risks inherent in
long-term, deferred payment transactions.' Taxpayers seeking to qualify
such transactions for installment reporting have structured their sales in ac-
cordance with two basic patterns. The first pattern may be characterized as
* Associate, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois. B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., Uni-
versity of Denver; LL.M. (Tax), New York University.
1. I.R.C. § 453(b)(1), in pertinent part, states:
Income from (A) a sale or other disposition of real property, or (B) a casual sale or
other casual disposition of personal property . . . for a price exceeding $1,000 may
(under regulations prescribed by the Secretary) be returned on the basis and in the
manner prescribed in subsection (a) [i.e., installment payment received times (gross
profit/total contract price)].
I.R.C. § 453(b)(2) limits the availability of § 453(b)(1) as follows: "Paragraph (1) shall apply only
if in the taxable year of the sale or other disposition (A) there are no payments, or (B) the
payments . . . do not exceed 30 percent of the selling price."
For a brief discussion of the legislative history of § 453, see Comment, Installment Sales-
Income Tax Consequences of Certificates of Deposit as Security, 41 TENN. L. REV. 113, 115-16
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Income Tax Consequences].
2. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 212(d), 44 Stat. 9 (Feb. 26, 1926).
3. The Service's position in both published and private rulings with respect to such trans-
actions has been antagonistic. See notes 13-27, 84, and accompanying text infra.
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the "related party" installment sale. 4 The hallmark of such a transaction is
an installment sale by the taxpayer to a relative or controlled business entity
who, or which, immediately resells the property to an independent third
party for a lump-sum consideration equal to the related party's adjusted basis
(cost) in the property. 5 In effect, the seller and related party, as an
economic unit, obtain the benefit of installment reporting while having ac-
cess to the full sales proceeds.
The second installment sale situation is a variation on the more conven-
tional related party pattern. This transaction involves the use of a trust in-
termediary. 6 Rather than first selling the property to a related individual or
controlled business entity, the seller transfers property on the installment
method to a new or existing trust. The trust is then free to dispose of the
newly acquired property to a third party. Usually, the resale proceeds are
the means by which the trust discharges its installment obligation.
7
At the outset, it must be noted that a taxpayer has an absolute right to
elect the benefits of section 453 if all of the statutory requirements are satis-
fied. ' This is true even if the purchaser is ready and willing to pay cash for
the property. 9 If the purchaser is unwilling to accept a deferred payment
arrangement, however, the seller is left only with the option of finding an
alternative purchaser.
Theoretical problems arise when the seller interjects an intermediary be-
tween the purchaser and seller in order to complete an already negotiated
4. See notes 13-61 and accompanying text iufra.
5. It is this element, an immediate resale at a price equal to the reseller's cost basis in the
property, that has rankled the Service and Congress. See notes 132-44 and accompanying text
infra.
6. As will be discussed subsequently, this pattern may be divided into two categories: sales
to related party-trusts and sales to trusts in order to qualify for installment reporting in a § 337
liquidation. The former sales arise out of the same fact patterns as the classic installment sales to
a related individual. See notes 88-105 and accompanying text infra. The latter sales are a prod-
net of the general rule prohibiting the use of § 453 between shareholders and corporations in a
§ 337 liquidation. See, e.g., Mercedes Frances Freeman Trust v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 799
(1961), aff'd, 303 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1962); Rev. Rul. 73-500, 1973-2 C.B. 113. See notes 62-87
and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 64-117 and accompanying text infra.
S. See Bookwalter v. Mayer, 345 F.2d 476 (8th Cir. 1965); Williams v. United States, 219
F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1955); McGillick v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1059 (1964); Reaver v.
Commissioner, 42 T.C. 72 (1964); Griffin v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 467 (1965).
9. See, e.g., Technical Advice Memorandum 7940002, where the Service cited Rev. Rul.
73-396, 1973-2 C.B. 160, and explained that:
[Rev. Rul. 73-396] involved a seller of substantially depreciated property who
negotiated a deferred payment sale on the installment basis after refusing to.accept
an offer by the purchaser to pay the full sale price in cash in the year of the sale.
We held in that ruling that the seller could elect to report his gain on the install-
ment method even though it was clear that the sale was made on the installment
basis for the purpose of deferring recognition of gain pursuant to section 453 of the
Code.
See also Pozzi v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 119, 128 (1967); Ludlow v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 102
(1961).
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sale for cash without losing the benefits of section 453. To date, the Service
has relied primarily upon the doctrines of constructive receipt and substance
over form when attacking the legitimacy of such transactions. 10 Unfortu-
nately, neither the courts nor the Service have applied these two theories
with any degree of consistency.
Faced with a growing body of inconsistent precedent, Congress has pro-
posed changes in section 453(b) designed to end abuses of the installment
reporting method." Unlike prior case law and rulings, however, the pro-
posed legislation focuses exclusively on the related party issue without men-
tioning resale of the property. 12  At present, the bill sweeps too broadly,
pulling within its ambit numerous legitimate installment sales that have
never been subject to attack by the Service even under the broadest reading
of the constructive receipt and substance over form doctrines.
This article will review the current law concerning installment sales in-
volving related parties or trusts. It then will examine in detail S. 1063 and
H.R. 3899, one legislative response to twenty-five years of inconsistency.
CLASSIFYING THE NATURE OF THE INSTALLMENT SALE
"Related Party" Sales
An installment sale involving a related party consists of three distinct par-
ties: the taxpayer (seller), the related party purchaser (related party), and an
independent third party purchaser (purchaser). Such transactions also in-
volve at least two sales: the original installment sale by the seller to the
related party, and a cash resale by the related party to the purchaser usually
in the same year as the original installment sale.
The classic example of this form of installment sale is found in Revenue
Ruling 73-157.13 The ruling outlines two situations: an installment sale by a
father to his son, and a similar installment sale by a taxpayer to his control-
led corporation. In both situations, the son and the corporation resold the
property to a third party pursuant to a prearranged plan of resale between
the taxpayer and the third party. The Service denied both taxpayers the ben-
efits of section 453 on the ground that both transactions lacked economic reality.
10. For an excellent discussion of the variations on these two theories relied upon by the
Commissioner see Coleman, Intrafanily Installment Sales, 180 N.Y.L.J. 1, 1-2 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Coleman]; Garrou, Installnent Sale to Related Party Can Still Work Despite IRS
Opposition, 42 J. TAx. 112 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Garroul; Goldstein & Coleman, Recent
Developents-Installinent Sales, 171 N.Y.L.J. 1, 4 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein]; In-
come Tax Consequences, supra note 1, at 120-27; Comment, Interspousal Installment Sales-
Taxpayers Required to Establish Purpose Other Than Tax Avoidance to Qualify Under Section
453 of the Internal Revenue Code, 30 VAND. L. REV. 274, 277-79 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Interspousal Installment Sales].
11. See S. 1063, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1979); H.R. 3899, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
See notes 128-44 and accompanying text infra.
12. See specifically notes 131-33, 140-44, and accompanying text infra.
13. 1973-1 C.B. 213.
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The taxpayer's son and the controlled corporation were deemed to have
served merely as agents or conduits for consummation of the taxpayer's
prearranged resale. 14
In Revenue Ruling 73-536, 15 the Service dispelled any notion that its con-
clusion in Revenue Ruling 73-157 resulted solely from a factual determina-
tion that the related party was obligated to resell the property pursuant to
the seller's prearranged negotiations. The ruling involved an installment sale
of securities by a wife to her husband. The parties intended that the hus-
band would immediately resell the securities to finance his own purchase of
them. A resale did not occur, however, until four months after the original
installment sale. 18
Citing Revenue Ruling 73-157, the Service ruled that the mere intention
of, or understanding between, the original parties that the related party
would resell the property was to be considered as "strong evidence that the
original sale lacked economic substance."17 As in the first situation dis-
cussed in Revenue Ruling 73-157, the Service concluded that the husband had
acted merely as an agent or conduit for his wife in selling the property,
emphasizing such factors as the relationship of the parties and their knowl-
edge of the husband's intent to resell. 18
Important differences between Revenue Ruling 73-157 and Revenue Rul-
ing 73-536 are apparent. Revenue Ruling 73-157 appears to define pre-
arranged resales in terms of the existence of three identifiable parties at
the time of the original installment sale. In that ruling, the purchaser and the
terms of his purchase agreement were known to both the seller and the
related party at the time the installment sale was consummated. 19 In con-
14. Id. The crucial factor in both of these transactions was that the seller negotiated the
resale directly with the purchaser prior to the installment sale. Id. Surprisingly, the Service did
not feel compelled to discuss the relationship of the parties to any extent.
15. 1973-2 C.B. 158.
16. Id. at 158-59. Nevertheless, the Service presumed that the related party's purchase was
designed solely to permit the taxpayer to avail herself of § 453. Id. at 159.
17. Id. In the opinion of the Service, the combination of marital relationship and an im-
mediate resale by the acquiring spouse negated any claim the taxpayer might have of economic
substance to the installment sale. See Coleman, supra note 10, at 2; Goldstein, supra note 10,
at 4.
It has been suggested that the Service is really applying an "at-risk" analysis to related parties
in § 453 transactions. Absent retention of the property for a specified period of time, Revenue
Ruling 73-157 and Revenue Ruling 3-536 conclude that the initial installment sales lacks sub-
stance. See O'Hare, Installment Sales to Related Parties Under Section 453(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code, 29 NAT'L T.J. 31, 32-34 (1976) [hereinafter cited as O'Hare].
18. Rev. Rul. 73-536, 1973-2 C.B. 158, at 159. One is left to wonder about the interrela-
tionship of the "lacking in economic substance" and the agency/conduit concepts. The former
hints at a substance over form analysis while the latter is rooted in the constructive receipt
doctrine. See notes 118-27 and accompanying text infra.
19. Rev. Rul. 73-157, 1973-1 C.B. 213. The ruling, interpreted in Nye v. United States, 407
F. Supp. 1345 (M.D.N.C. 1975), was distinguished on that ground. See notes 35-42 and accom-
panying text infra.
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trast, Revenue Ruling 73-536 did not involve a prearranged resale. Instead,
the seller and related party only intended that the related party would resell
the property. The identity of the purchaser and the terms of the resale
agreement were unknown at the time of the installment sale.
20
Revenue Ruling 73-536, unlike Revenue Ruling 73-157, concedes that
under the proper circumstances, a sale between related parties, followed by
an immediate resale, may qualify for section 453 installment treatment. 2
1
Unfortunately, the ruling fails to identify what constitutes the proper cir-
cumstances. Also, it is difficult to determine whether it was more important
that there was a prearranged sale or that related parties were involved in the
transaction. 22 Finally, the ruling's definition of prearranged resale seems
too broad. 23 It is doubtful that the definition of prearranged resale should
extend beyond sales negotiated between the seller and the purchaser prior
to the seller's installment sale of the property to a related party. 24
The scope of Revenue Ruling 73-157 was expanded by the Service in Rev-
enue Ruling 77-414, 25 where the taxpayer desired to sell the development
rights to his property to a local county board. He sought to report the trans-
20. Rev. Rul. 73-536, 1973-1 C.B. 158, at 159. In Roberts v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 311
(1978) (appeal filed by the Government with the 9th Cir.), the court approved an installment
sale to a newly-created trust despite the trust's avowed intention to resell the property. See
notes 96-103 and accompanying text infra. The court noted that a prearranged plan to resell
stock for its market value, a sum not subject to influence by the parties, did not vitiate the
installment sale. The court, however, was careful to note that the trust was under no obligation
to resell. 71 T.C. at 323. See also Schnee, Installment Sales: An Available Planning Device, 57
TAXES 174, 176-77 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Schnee].
21. The Service premised its concession on the "'reality" of the underlying installment sale,
stating:
A transaction involving an installment sale between clearly related taxpayers if
allowed by a resale of the property to an unrelated third party may be bona fide,
and thus, qualify for the installment method of reporting. However, if such a trans-
action purporting to be an installment sale lacks reality, it will be no more effective
in avoiding taxes than any other type of sale.
Rev. Rul. 73-536, 1973-2 C.B. 158, at 159.
22. Both factors are emphasized in the ruling. Id.
23. A mere intention to resell, without the presence of an actual prearranged resale, was
treated as the equivalent of a prearranged resale. The Service seems to indicate that the closer
the relationship among the parties the less immediate or certain the resale needs to be in order
to trigger the agency/conduit or economic substance arguments. Unfortunately this analysis was
not adopted in Revenue Ruling 77-414, 1977-2 C.B. 299. See notes 25-28, 43-45 and accom-
panying text infra.
24. See, e.g., Nye v. United States, 407 F. Supp. at 1348-49; but cf. Weaver v. Commis-
sioner, 71 T.C. 443 (1978) (appeal filed by the government with the 9th Cir.) (where the court
observed that sales through "straw parties" were not to be respected).
See Rev. Rul. 73-536, 1973-2 C.B. at 159, where the Service noted that as a prerequisite to
recognition of an installment sale, the sale must reflect economic reality. See Williams v. United
States, 219 F.2d at 527; Griffiths v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A.,314 (1938), rev'd, 103 F.2d 110
(7th Cir. 1939), aff'd, 308 U.S. 355, 357-58 (1939). In addition, such sales may not merely pass
title through a conduit. See, e.g., Hallowell v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 600, 606-08 (1971);
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 2 T.C. 531 (1943), revd, 143 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1944),
rev'd, 324 331, 333-34 (1945).
25. 1977-2 C.B. 299.
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action under section 453, but local law prohibited the board from purchasing
property on the installment method. Therefore, the county interposed an
independent, third party bank between itself and the taxpayer. Pursuant to a
prearranged plan, the taxpayer sold the development right to the bank
under the installment method, and the bank immediately conveyed the right
to the county for a lump-sum payment. 26
Citing Revenue Ruling 73-157, the Service concluded that the bank was
an "unnecessary" intermediary. 27  In support of this conclusion, the Service
cited the Tax Court decision in Wrenn v. Commissioner. 2s Wrenn involved
an installment sale of stock by a husband to his wife. Mrs. Wrenn resold the
stock on the same day and, pursuant to the original sales agreement, pur-
chased mutual fund shares as security for her installment obligations. 29 The
Commissioner contended that the entire transaction lacked a business pur-
pose, identifying such factors as the intrafhmily nature of the sale, the pre-
arranged resale, and the retention of the proceeds within the family unit. 30
The Tax Court held that while interspousal sales are subject to close
scrutiny, they do not per se create an agency relationship. 31 Rather, the
court determined that the legitimacy of an intrafamily installment sale should
be tested by the degree of independence of the parties and the presence of a
substantive, if not a business, purpose. 32  In light of the marital relationship
26. Id. at 299-300. The ruling indicates that the county chose a specific bank. The sales
proceeds paid to the bank by the county were not to be held by the bank as an escrow agent,
nor would the funds be held in an escrow account. In addition, the bank did not hold the funds
as a deposit by or on behalf of the taxpayer. Finally, the bank was free to reinvest the funds as
it saw fit. Id. at 300.
27. Id. at 301. the ruling is conclusory in its analysis. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile its
conclusion with that of the earlier rulings in light of the latters' emphasis on the degree of control
exercised by the seller over the intermediary. See Rev. Rul. 75-536, 1973-2 C.B. 158, at 159;
Rev. Rul. 73-157, 1973-1 C.B. 213. The Service's conclusion that the transaction may be a sham
appears incorrect. The bank served as the agent of the purchaser not the seller. The seller
possessed no control over the intermediary. There is no indication that the transaction between
the taxpayer and the bank was not what it appeared to be, an arm's length installment sale.
Therefore, no reason existed to deny the seller the use of § 453.
28. 67 T.C. 576 (1976).
29. Id. at 577-78.
30. Id. at 579. Absent from the Commissioner's argument was any reference to the construc-
tive receipt doctrine. Rather, the Commissioner premised his attack on the substance over form
doctrine. Id.
31. Id. at 582. The court concluded that close scrutiny was necessary anytime the relation-
ship of the parties afforded the possibility of tax avoidance. Id. at 584.
32. Id. The court did not dispute the applicability of the control or economic benefit test of
Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g, 52 T.C. 888 (1969). Id. at 581-
82. The primary concern of the court, however, was clearly the lack of a substantive purpose for
the installment sale. Id. at 583-84. The court concluded that Mrs. Wrenn's immediate resale of
the shares was indicative of the fact that she did not purchase them for their intrinsic worth.
Nor did Mrs. Wrenn regard the shares as a means of obtaining funds at a low interest rate (four
percent), for there was no indication that she needed such funds. Finally, the sole reason for
her purchase of mutual fund shares was to satisfy her obligation under the installment sales
agreement. Id. at 583. As for Mr. Wrenn, the court rejected his contention that the increase in
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of the parties, the intended resale of the property by the related party, and
the lack of any substantive purpose for the original installment sale, the
court concluded that the taxpayer failed to carry his burden of proof. 33
The "substantive purpose" concept is of particular significance in
Wrenn because the Service relied only on the "substance over form" doc-
trine. By focusing on the substantive purpose behind the related party's in-
stallment purchase, the Wrenn court relegated the factors of relationship of
the parties and prearranged, or pre-intended, resale to their proper place, as
merely indicia of a suspect transaction. If the constructive receipt doctrine
had been the focus of the Wrenn court, the degree of relationship between
the seller and the related party might have been the determinative factor
because under this doctrine, taxation of the seller on the full sales proceeds
turns on the issue of the seller's control over the related party. 34
In contrast to the result in Wrenn, an intrafamily installment sale was
recognized as bona fide in Nye v. United States. 35 As in Wrenn, one spouse
in Nye sold securities on the installment method to the other spouse. The
taxpayer was aware of her husband's intention immediately to resell the se-
curities in order to liquidate his own business liabilities. 36 Citing Revenue
Ruling 73-157, the Commissioner contended that the marital relationship of
the parties placed the purchasing spouse in the position of an agent or con-
duit for the selling spouse. 37
Based on Rushing v. Commissioner, 38 the court concluded that the proper
test for determining the legitimacy of an intrafamily installment sale was
whether the seller directly or indirectly controlled the proceeds of the resale
or derived any economic benefit from the transaction. 39 The court rejected
his investment return percentage from three percent to five percent constituted a sufficient
"substantive purpose" to satisfy § 453. Id. at 584.
33. Id. See the brief discussion of these factors in Interspousal Installment Sales, supra note
10, at 279-80.
34. If the Service had argued the constructive receipt doctrine rather than the substance
over form concept, the issue of substantive purpose would have been irrelevant. The substan-
tive purpose issue, however, plays a vital role where the substance over form doctrine is in
issue. By attacking the very substance of a sale, the Service implicitly shifts the burden to the
taxpayer to defend the form of the transaction chosen. Demonstration of a substantive purpose
to the form of the transaction chosen is one means by which the taxpayer may defend such
form. See notes 118-27 and accompanying text infra.
Where the constructive receipt argument is the focus, the only real issue is the degree of
control exercised by the seller over the intermediary. The form of the transaction is only of
secondary importance. See the discussion of Nye v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 1345
(M.D.N.C. 1975), at notes 35-39 and accompanying text infra.
35. 407 F. Supp. 1345 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
36. Id. at 1347-48.
37. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument asserting that "[t]he prearranged plan
argument only makes sense when a three party transaction makes use of a strawman as a con-
duit between the first and third parties . . . ." Id. at 1350.
38. 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g, 52 T.C. 888 (1969). See the discussion of Rushing at
notes 64-74 and accompanying text infra.
39. Nye v. United States, 407 F. Supp. at 1349.
1979]
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the Service's contention that the mere fact the seller was aware of the re-
lated party's intent to resell precluded the seller from reporting her gain on
the installment method. 40
In addition, the court denied that the marital relationship of the parties,
standing alone, was determinative of the issue.41 Although such a relation-
ship might give rise to a presumption of agency, the court observed that the
unique factual setting of the transaction rebutted any such presumption.
Pointing to the economic independence of each spouse, the sizeable personal
estate of each, and the absence of any apparent control by the wife over the
resale proceeds, the court rejected the Service's analogy to Revenue Ruling
73-157.42
The breadth of Revenue Ruling 77-414 demonstrates the Service's con-
tinued adherence to the resale element as the primary indicia of a "sham" in-
stallment sale. Absent in this ruling is any mention of the seller's control
over, or economic benefit from, the resale proceeds.43 In fact, the Service
appears to concede that the seller and intermediary bank were totally unre-
40. 1d. at 1350. The court distinguished Revenue Ruling 73-157. The court opined that an
attack by the Service based on a "'prearranged plan" of resale only makes sense when two
parties purposely interpose a straw conduit. The Service made no argument that any plan of
sale ever existed between Mrs. Nye and the eventual purchasers. The court concluded: "Cer-
tainly the I.R.S. cannot be contending that any time an installment purchaser makes it known
to the installment seller that he . . . plans to resell at some future date the installment seller
immediately loses his . . . right to report gain pursuant to section 453(b)." Id. This statement
goes far beyond the four corners of the Nye facts. In Nye, the parties were married; however,
the ultimate purchaser was unknown, the husband held the stock for six months, and the hus-
band and wife demonstrated some degree of economic independence. 407 F. Supp. at 1350.
Therefore, Nye represents no more than a factual determination that the sale between husband
and wife was bona fide, at arm's length, and worthy of recognition as an independent transac-
tion. See Comment, Federal Income Tax-Use of Installment Sale Reporting for Sales Between
Related Taxpayers: the Separate v. Single Economic Entity Argument, 54 N.C. L. REV. 714,
717-20 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Use 'of Installment Sale Reporting].
41. Nye v. United States, 407 F. Supp. at 1349-50. It is questionable whether the Service
focused solely upon the marital relationship of the parties or upon a combination of relationship
and immediate resale.
42. Id. at 1350. See also note 40 supra. The Nye and Wrenn decisions are difficult to distin-
guish. The foremost distinguishing factor between the two decisions is the lack of any substan-
tive purpose in Wrenn. If the three-pronged test outlined in Wrenn, see note 33 and accom-
panying text supra, is applied to the facts of Nye, it is difficult to support the Nye result. It
would appear that the two factors most important to the outcome of these two decisions were
the length of time the purchasing spouse held the property, and the presence of any substantive
purpose for the purchasing spouse to acquire the property in an installment sale.
43. Control over the related party always has been considered crucial in the related party
installment sale cases. In Nye v. United States, the court specifically found that the facts rebut-
ted any inference that Mr. Nye was an agent for his wife. 407 F. Supp. at 1350. Even more to
the point, in Wrenn, the Tax Court stated: "As noted in Nye, bona fide transfers of this nature
are to be accorded section 453 relief, but in order to be deemed bona fide both the buyer and
seller must demonstrate their independence .. " 67 T.C. at 582. See Tripp, Installment Sales
to Related Parties, 52 TAXES 261, 265-67 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Tripp] (prearranged resales
indicate no independence on the part of the purchaser). See also O'Hare, supra note 17, at
32-34 (prearranged resale demonstrates control by the seller-analogy to escrow cases discussed
in note 84 infra).
SECTION 453
lated. 44 The very premise of Revenue Ruling 73-157 and Revenue Ruling
73-536, that the relationship between the seller and the related party de-
notes some degree of control by the seller over the resale proceeds, has
vanished. In view of the relationship between the local county board and the
bank, it is difficult to imagine a clearer instance of a bona fide, arm's length
transaction between unrelated parties. 45 In contrast, the control or
economic benefit test of Rushing stands at the heart of the Nye and Wrenn
decisions. Neither court disputed the applicability of the Rushing test to the
facts before them. The difference in results in these two decisions may be
explained on the basis of their factual differences. 46
Recently, the Nye approach was affirmed in Oman Construction Co. v.
Commissioner.47 Oman involved multiple resales of certain construction
equipment. The Commissioner alleged that the installment sale by the
partners in Acme, the assignee of Oman, to an intermediary entity, Volun-
teer, lacked substance because of a prearranged resale by Volunteer. 48 Cit-
ing Rushing, the court examined each transaction to determine if the sellers,
directly or indirectly, controlled the proceeds of the resale or derived any
economic benefit. In contrast to Revenue Ruling 73-536, the court rejected
the Service's reliance upon the prearranged-resale-by-the-intermediary
theory.49  Noting that neither the seller nor the intermediary knew at the
time of the sale who the purchaser on resale would be, the eight-month
interval between sale and resale, and the absence of any evidence that the
taxpayers controlled the intermediary, the court sanctioned the taxpayers'
use of section 453.50
44. See Rev. Rul. 77-414, 1877-2 C.B. 299, at 301, where the Service states: "[a]lthough the
intermediate purchaser is not related to the taxpayer in the instant case, the transaction would
be similar to the situations described in Rev. Rul. 73-157, and the taxpayer will be considered
to have received the full purchase price in the year of the sale."
45. See note 26 supra.
46. See Wrenn v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. at 582 ("Although we agree with that analysis of
the law pertaining to interspousal installment sales, [citing Nye's reference to Rushing], we must
determine whether these petitioners have demonstrated that they qualify.
47. 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1849-57 (1978).
48. Id. at 1849-65. Oman Construction Corporation (OCC) sold certain equipment to Oman
Partnership (OP) in April, 1968. The partners in OP were the controlling shareholders of OCC.
OP resold some of the equipment between April, 1968, and May, 1969, at which time it distri-
buted any remaining equipment to the partners. The partners then contributed the property to
Acme, a partnership in which they were the sole partners. Acme immediately sold the equip-
ment on the installment basis to Volunteer, Ltd., who, in turn, resold the equipment to Mer-
cury eight months later. The court found that Volunteer and Acme were unrelated. Id. at
1849-59.
49. Id.
50. The court observed that Volunteer had no knowledge at the time of the installment sale
that it would be able to resell to Mercury. A major factor supporting this conclusion was the
eight-month interval between purchase and resale. Id.'at 1849-65. In effect, the court applied
the "at risk" theory to legitimate the intermediary installment sale. See O'Hare, supra note 17,
at 33-34.
Section 482 may have some impact on sales between related business entities. See 'I.R.C.
§ 482. The statute permits the Commissioner to distribute gross income between commonly con-
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Finally, to be contrasted with the Oman and Nye decisions is the often-
cited 1939 Supreme Court case, Griffiths v. Commissioner. 51 In Griffiths,
the taxpayer negotiated a resale of stock to a party who had fraudulently sold
the same stock to the taxpayer in an earlier transaction. Pursuant to the plan
of sale, but unknown to the purchaser, the taxpayer formed a new, wholly-
owned corporation, sold the stock to it, and completed the resale through
the corporation. The proceeds of the sale were paid directly to the taxpayer
who immediately transferred them to the corporation.52
The United States Supreme Court held that the tax laws were less con-
cerned with title than they were with command or control over the
economic benefit from the property. 53 In the Court's opinion, control could
be exercised in numerous ways, such as retention of title, creation of a con-
trolled entity, or interposition of a subservient agent. The Court concluded
that the taxpayer's control over the wholly-owned corporation warranted
treating the taxpayer as if he had actually received the proceeds directly. 54
In summary, the courts and the Service have identified numerous factors
relevant to the issue of the legitimacy of an installment sale to a related
party. Some of the most important factors are: 1) the nature of the relation-
ship between the seller and the related party; 55 2) the presence of a prear-
ranged plan of resale to an identifiable purchaser; 56 3) the proximity in time
trolled or owned business entities. It is interesting to speculate on whether the Commissioner
may raise § 482 as a possible means of attributing the full resale proceeds received by a resel-
ling business entity to the related business entity from which it acquired the property on the
installment basis. See Adess, The Role of Section 482 in Nonrecognition Transactions-The Outer
Edges of its Application, 57 TAxEs 946 (1979).
51. 308 U.S. 355 (1939).
52. Id. at 356-57.
53. Id. at 357-58.
54. Id. To be contrasted with Oman and compared with Griffiths is Hindes v. United
States, 326 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1964), rev'g, 246 F. Supp. 147 (W.D. Tex. 1964), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 908 (1964). Subsequent to accepting the purchaser's offer of $300,000 cash for his
property, the taxpayer formed a corporation, the sole stockholders of which were his mother,
father, and attorney. This corporation was capitalized with $1,000 and the property was sold to
it for $265,000 in notes payable over ten years. The court concluded that the corporation was
merely an agent of the seller. Id. at 151-52. Interestingly, there is no mention of the Griffiths
decision in Hindes. See the discussion of Hindes in Coleman, supra note 10, at 2; Tripp, supra
note 43, at 263 n.10.
55. See Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 US. at 356-57 (controlled corporation); Hindes v.
United States, 326 F.2d at 151 (controlled corporation); Nye v. United States, 407 F. Supp. at
1349 (husband and wife); Wrenn v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. at 582-84 (husband and wife); Oman
-Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1849-65 (related businesses); Rev. Rul.
73-536, 1973-2 C.B. 158, at 158-59 (husband and wife); Rev. Rul. 73-157, 1973-1 C.B. 213 (son
and controlled corporation).
56. See Grifflths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. at 357-58 (prearranged plan to resell); Hindes
v. United States, 326 F.2d at 151-52 (prearranged plan to resell); Oman Construction Co. v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH), at 1849-65 (no prearranged plan); Rev. rul. 77-414, 1977-2
C.B. 299, at 301 (prearranged plan).
The Service will attack such prearranged transactions solely on the presence of an intent to
resell. See Nye v. United States, 407 F. Supp. at 1350 (mere intent to resell); Wrenn v. Com-
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between the installment sale and the resale; 57 4) the presence of a business
or substantive purpose for the structure of the transaction; 58 5) the retention
of proceeds within the economic family unit;59 6) if a business entity is in-
terposed, whether such entity is a newly-formed entity or an existing en-
tity; 60 and 7) whether the installment obligation of the related party may be
accelerated. 61
Seller-Created Trusts
The second form of installment sale employed by taxpayers seeking to
obtain the benefits of section 453 involves the interposition of a trust, rather
than an individual or other business entity, between the seller and the ulti-
mate purchaser. These transactions may be subdivided into two distinct
categories: trusts used in connection with section 337 liquidations,62 and
trusts used to effectuate resales on the open market. 63
Installment Sales of Stock in a Liquidating Corporation
to a Trust: Sections 453 and 337
The most famous of the installment sales cases involving a sale to a trust of
stock in a corporation liquidating under section 337 is Rushing v. Commis-
sioner. 64 Rushing involved a taxpayer who was one of two coequal owners
missioner, 67 T.C. at 584 (mere intent to resell); Rev. Rul. 77-414, 1977-2 C.B. 299, at 299-301
(mere intent). For a discussion of the impact of an immediate resale see Coleman, supra note
10, at 2; Garrau, supra note 10, at 113-14; Goldstein, supra note 10, at 124; O'Hare, supra note
17, at 33-34; Use of Installment Sale Reporting, supra note 40, at 719-20; Interspousal Install-
ment Sales, supra note 10, at 279-81.
57. See Nye v. United States, 407 F. Supp. at 1347 (resale four months later-installment
sale recognized); Wrenn v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. at 578, 583 (resale on same day as sale-
installment treatment denied); Oman Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) at
1849-65 (eight months between sale and resale-installment sale recognized); Rev. Rul. 73-536,
1973-2 C.B. 158, at 159 (resale in same year as installment sale-installment sale treatment de-
nied.). See also Goldstein, supra note 10, at 4 (unsuccessful resale attempts add credibility to the
original installment sale); O'Hare, supra note 17, at 33-34 (immediate resale gives rise to an
inference that the purchaser was not "at risk"-the longer a related party is at risk the more
bona fide the installment sale appears).
58. See Wrenn v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. at 583-85 (no substantive purpose). See also
Coleman, supra note 10, at 1-2, Interspousal Installment Sales, supra note 10, at 279-81.
59. See Nye v. United States, 407 F. Supp. at 1349-50; Wrenn v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. at
579, 684; Rev. Rul. 73-536, 1973-2 C.B. 158, at 159; Rev. Rul. 73-157, 1973-1 C.B. 213. See
also Coleman, supra note 10, at 2; Use of lnstallment Sale Reporting, supra note 40, at 717-20.
60. See Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. at 356-58 (newly-formed corporation treated as
a sham); Hindes v. United States, 326 F.2d at 151-52 (5th Cir. 1964) (newly-formed corpora-
tion treated as a conduit); Rev. Rul. 73-157, 1973-2 C.B. 213 (ruling doesn't state whether the
corporate conduit was a pre-existing entity or a newly-formed corporation). See also Garrou,
supra note 10, at 113-14 (newly-formed corporation subject to attack under Commissioner v.
Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945)).
61. See Private Letter Ruling 783004 (March 28, 1978); Tripp, supra note 43, at 267-68.
62. See note 6 supra. See also notes 64-87 and accompanying text infra.
63. See note 6 supra. See also notes 88-105 and accompanying text infra.
64. 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'g, 52 T.C. 888 (1969).
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of two corporations. In 1962, the corporations adopted section 337 plans of
liquidation. 65 Thereafter, all the assets of the corporations were sold. Just
prior to the expiration of the statutory twelve-month period within which the
corporations were required to liquidate, the taxpayer sold his shares in the
liquidating corporations on the installment basis to a newly-formed, irrevoc-
able trust. 66
In an attempt to deny the taxpayer the benefits of section 453, the Com-
missioner raised such arguments as assignment of income, agency/conduit,
and constructive receipt. 67 The court rejected all three contentions. In the
opinion of the court, the assignment of income concept addressed the issue
of which taxpayer was the proper taxable party. 68 The court noted that in
Rushing there was no question whether the seller would eventually recog-
nize the full amount of his gain; the only real issue was one of timing.69
Under such circumstances, the court could not find any grounds for invoking
the assignment of income doctrine.
Turning to the constructive receipt and agency arguments, the court
stated the test as follows: "In order to receive any installment benefits the
seller may not directly or indirectly have control over the proceeds or pos-
sess the economic benefits therefrom." 70  Applying this test, the court em-
phasized the following factors: 1) the trust was an autonomous entity that
was irrevocable and independent of the taxpayer's control; the trust was
neither a puppet nor an "economic serf" of the taxpayer; 7 1 2) the taxpayer
65. Id. I.R.C. § 337(a) states:
If, within the 12-month period beginning on the date on which a corporation adopts
a plan of complete liquidation, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in
complete liquidation ... no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation
from the sale or exchange by it of property within such 12-month period.
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.337-1 which states: "All assets ... both tangible and intangible, must
be distributed within the 12-month period."
66. 441 F.2d at 594.
67. Id. at 597-98. The purpose behind the transaction as structured by the taxpayer was to
avoid the prohibition on the use of § 453 in conjunction with a liquidating distribution under
§ 337. See Mercedes Frances Freeman Trust v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 580, 584 (8th Cir. 1962),
aff'g, 36 T.C. 779 (1961); Rev. Rul. 73-500, 1973-2 C.B. 113, at 114. Therefore, the Commis-
sioner was reluctant to permit the taxpayers to obtain indirectly a result they could not obtain
directly.
68. The court stated:
[Tihis is not a case where one taxpayer has attempted to shift the gain to a second
taxable entity in order to reap the benefits of the second entity's lower tax rate. The
price the trust paid the taxpayers for the stock was the full value of the stock,
including the appreciation in value which would be realized upon liquidation. We
therefore find the Commissioner's reliance upon the anticipatory assignment of in-
come theory entirely misplaced simply because no income was assigned.
441 F.2d at 597.
69. In turn, the timing issue was viewed as a constructive receipt question. Id.
70. Id. at 598.
71. Id. See the discussion of the control element in Weaver v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 443
(1978) (appeal filed by the government with the 9th Cir.) in notes 75-87 and accompanying text
infra.
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retained no control over the liquidating distribution; 72 and 3) the trustee had
independent duties and responsibilities to persons other than the tax-
payer. 73 Relying on these factors, the court held the section 453 sale to be
bona fide.
74
Recently, Rushing was affirmed in Weaver v. Commissioner. 75 In this
instance, the taxpayer and his brother each owned fifty percent of the stock
of Columbia Match Co. (CMC). After completing negotiations for the sale of
all of the corporate assets, the taxpayer and his brother each created irrevoc-
able trusts for their children and sold their CMC stock on the installment
method to the trust. Immediately thereafter, the bank, as trustee, adopted a
section 337 plan of liquidation, liquidated the corporation, and transferred
the assets to the purchaser. 76 The Service attacked this arrangement on
numerous grounds. The major theories proffered were lack of economic real-
ity, agency/conduit, and substance over form. 77 In a detailed opinion, the
court rejected all of these arguments and held for the taxpayer. 78
The decision in Weaver rests squarely on the two-part, control or
economic benefit test of Rushing. 79 The court observed that in Rushing the
sale had economic substance because the trustee had the power to void the
72. The taxpayer owned exactly 50% of the voting stock. 441 F.2d at 598.
73. For example, the trustee had duties to the beneficiaries of the trust. Id. In reality, the
taxpayer's only effective means of obtaining the benefit of the liquidation was under the install-
ment obligations of the trust. Id.
Prior to Weaver, many authors felt uneasy with the Rushing decision. One writer has ques-
tioned whether the trustee's power to void the § 337 liquidation was illusory in light of the fact
that the corporation had disposed of all of its assets prior to the taxpayer's sales to the trusts. In
this author's opinion, the trust's power to void the liquidation was the crucial factor in Rushing.
Galant, Section 337 and the Rushing Case, 50 TAXES 216, 220-23 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Galant]. This author also raised additional questions such as could a Rushing trust work where
the taxpayer owned more than 50% control of the corporation or where the corporate sale of
assets was for cash rather than notes? Id. See also Garrou, supra note 10, at 112-15 (the trustees
in Rushing would have had a fiduciary duty to sell such a large block of stock).
74. 441 F.2d at 598.
75. 71 T.C. 443 (1978) (appeal filed by the government with the 9th Cir.).
76. On July 14, 1971, the sellers and the ultimate purchaser reached a tentative sale agree-
ment. A draft of the sale contract was completed on July 21, 1971. On July 28, 1971, the seller
created and funded the trusts. On July 29, 1971, the installment sale to the trust occurred. On
July 30, 1971, the plan of liquidation was adopted and the assets were sold to the ultimate
purchaser. Id. at 444-48.
77. Id. at 450, 455.
78. The court concluded that:
After the transfer of the stock to the trusts, the petitioner's recourse was limited
to recovery as provided in the installment sales agreement. "From an economic
standpoint the trust, unlike a mere conduit or straw party, had significant potential
benefits and risks from the transaction." See Pityo v. Commissioner supra at 237.
Petitioners had neither the control of nor the economic benefit from the liquidation
proceeds.
Id. at 455.
79. The court stated that "[we think the Rushing and Pityo cases were decided correctly
and are precedent controlling the' disposition of this case." Id. at 452.
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plan of liquidation. 80 In Weaver, as in Rushing, the trust was irrevocable,
the trustee was independent of the taxpayer, and the trustee owed fiduciary
responsibilities to the beneficiaries (of which the taxpayer was not one).8 1
Despite the presence of a prearranged, informal understanding between the
seller and the trust that the trust would resell the assets, the trustee was
under no obligation to do so. The trustee's sole legal duty was to act inde-
pendently to protect the interests of the beneficiaries. 82
Examining specific prohibitions in the trust agreement regarding invasions
of principal, the court determined that none of the limitations were unfavor-
able to the trust or designed to prevent the possibility of an appreciating
corpus. 83 Such factors as the taxpayer's lack of control over trust invest-
ments, the absence of any collateral for the trust's installment obligations,
and the risk of corpus appreciation or depreciation inherent in the trust's
investment policies, distinguished this arrangement from the line of unfavor-
able escrow cases. 84 The court observed that two issues of control inhered
80. Id. at 451. The court, however, bifurcated the control issue into control over the liqui-
dation and control over the trust. Apart from the issue of control over the liquidation, the court
noted that control over the trust might be determinative of the issue of whether a sale had
economic substance. Id. at 454-55.
81. Id. at 452-54.
82. 1d. at 452. The court noted that the determinative fact in the Weaver decision was the
trustee's ability to act in an independent capacity. Id. In support of its conclusions, the court
also cited Pityo v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 225 (1978). As in Rushing, the Pityo trustee was free
to resell or not resell the stock acquired in the earlier installment sale at its own discretion. Id.
at 238.
83. This fact negated the inference that the sole reason for the trust's purchase was to
enable the seller to qualify for § 453 treatment. 71 T.C. at 453-54.
84. Concurrently with the developments in the related party line of cases, a body of law
involving installment sales and escrows has emerged. The typical fact pattern involves a seller
who seeks to report gain on the installment method and an ultimate purchaser who desires to
pay cash. To accommodate both parties, the full sales proceeds are placed in an escrow (e.g.,
cash, certificates of deposit, or notes of a third party), the sole function of which is to defer
payment of such proceeds to the seller. With only one recent exception, the courts and the
Service have applied the constructive receipt doctrine to accelerate the full proceeds into the
seller's gross income in the year of sale. See Rev. Rul. 77-294, 1977-2 C.B. 173, revoking Rev.
Rul. 68-246, 1968-1 C.B. 198; Rev. Rul. 73-451, 1973-2 C.B. 158; Private Letter Ruling 783004
(March 28, 1978); Private Letter Ruling 7751051 (Sept. 22, 1977). See also Harris v. Commis-
sioner, 477 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'g, 56 T.C. 1165 (1971); Williams v. United States, 219
F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1965); Rhodes v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 894 (W.D.S.C. 1965); Lustgar-
ten v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 303 (1978); Stiles v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 558 (1978), acq.
1978-2 C.B. 2; Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 569 (1971); Pozzi v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 119
(1967); Trivett v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 675 (1977). See also Goldstein, supra note
10, at 4; Parker, Substitution of Escrow Will Destroy Benefits of Installment Sale Says IRS, 47
J. TAx. 346 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Parker]; Comment, Taxation: Use of Escrow Arrange-
nents in Installment Sales, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 543 (1974); Income Tax Consequences, supra note
1, at 113.
Recently, in Porterfield v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. No. 8 (Oct. 15, 1979), Tax Ct. Rep. (CCH)
4120, the Tax Court permitted a taxpayer to report his gain on the sale of certain property on
the installment method despite the interposition of an escrow funded with certificates of de-
posit. The documents of sale recited that the seller had received $285,000 in cash from the
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in the Weaver arrangement: the trust's control over the liquidation, and the
taxpayer's control over the trust. 85 The absence of the latter of these two
factors was found to be determinative of the Service's substance over form
argument. 86
The Weaver court concluded by outlining three factors crucial to its deci-
sion in favor of the taxpayer. First, the taxpayer exercised no direct or indi-
rect control over the trust. The trusts were independent and did not serve
as mere conduits for the taxpayer. Second, recovery of the taxpayer's in-
vestment was limited solely to the trust's installment obligations. Third, the
trust bore significant economic risks of corpus appreciation or deprecia-
tion. 87
Trusts to Effectuate Open-Market Sales
Installment sales to taxpayer-created trusts for the purpose of effecting
sales of the same property on the open market closely approximate the re-
lated party installment sale cases. The most important of these decisions is
purchaser. In fact, the purchaser deposited the proceeds in an escrow. The terms of the escrow
required that such proceeds be invested in certificates of deposit, and that as the purchaser's
installments obligations matured, the escrow agent would cash a certificate and pay such funds
directly to the seller. The Commissioner, citing Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 569 (1971), con-
tended that the seller had received the entire sales proceeds in the year of sale. The court
distinguished Oden on the grounds that in that decision the parties intended the escrow to
serve as an independent source of payment. In contrast, the court in Porterfield determined
that the escrow was intended merely as a security device, the seller continued to look to the
purchaser as the sole obligor, all interest on the escrowed proceed was paid to the purchaser,
and the purchaser personally made all payments on his notes. Tax Ct. Rep. at 4124.
As in the case of sales to related parties, the recent case law has evidenced a shift away from
the constructive receipt doctrine and toward the substance over form analysis. The Porterfield
decision is an excellent example of this trend. Despite finding that the escrow arrangement
withstood a substance over form analysis, the court ignored the constructive receipt doctrine.
Consistent with the early constructive receipt cases, however, the courts will not tax the seller
on the full sales proceeds if the escrow arrangement imposes a substantial restriction on the
seller's receipt of such proceeds, other than the mere passage of time. See Stiles v. Commis-
sioner, 69 T.C. 558 (1978), acq., 1978-2 C.B. 2; Oden v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 569 (1971);
Murray v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 624 (1933), acq., XII-2 C.B. 11; Rev. Rul. 79-91, 1979-11
I.R.B.9. See Solomon & Kirkelie, The Installment Sale-Qualification, 26 U.S. CALIF. TAx. INST.
669, 790-97 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Solomon & Kirkeliel.
85. 71 T.C. at 454-55.
86. Id. at 453-54. See also note 80 and accompanying text supra. The court's emphasis on
the degree of control exercised by the seller over the trust, rather than over the liquidation,
casts serious doubts as to the substance of the fears raised by one commentator. See the discus-
sion in note 73 supra. By focusing upon the seller's control over the trust, such issues as the
seller's percentage ownership in the liquidating corporation and the nature of the consideration
received by the corporation for its asset become less significant. Nevertheless, it is important to
note that the seller in Weaver only owned 50% of the liquidating corporations. In contrast to
Rushing, however, it would appear that no sale of assets occurred prior to the installment sale
to the trust, and the eventual purchase price for the assets was paid in cash by the buyer. Id. at
446-48.
87. 71 T.C. at 455.
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Pityo v. Commissioner,88 involving a taxpayer who created five irrevocable
trusts for his children, gave $100,000 to the trusts, and, on the same day,
sold $1,032,000 worth of stock to the trusts on the installment basis. Prior to
the sale, the taxpayer was advised that the stock should be sold and rein-
vested in mutual funds. The trustee agreed with such a plan, and the parties
expressly indicated their intent that the proceeds be reinvested accord-
ingly.8 9 Similar to theories proffered in Rushing and Weaver, the
Commissioner again raised the constructive receipt, agency/conduit, and
substance over form arguments. 90
Once again, the court found the control or economic benefit test of Rush-
ing to be determinative. As in Weaver and Rushing, the court emphasized
that the trust was an independent entity with fiduciary obligations to its
beneficiaries. 9 1  The court distinguished Revenue Ruling 73-157 on the
grounds that a prearranged resale was absent. In that ruling, the installment
sale was made only after a prearranged sale with the ultimate purchaser had
been negotiated. In contrast, the Pityo trust was under no obligation to re-
sell. Although the taxpayer expected the trusts to resell the stock, the trus-
tee was under no obligation to do so.92 Like the Weaver court, the Pityo
court observed that the trust bore significant risk of potential future gain or
loss. At all times, however, its duty of exclusive allegiance to the ben-
eficiaries, not the settlor, was controlling. Therefore, the trustee's prior,
informal understanding with the taxpayer that it would resell the shares was
deemed not to be determinative. 93
88. 70 T.C. 225 (1978).
89. Id. at 227-30. Prior to the installment sales to the trusts, the taxpayer discussed his
declining financial condition with his stockbroker. Both the installment sale and the investment
in mutual fund shares were at the broker's advice. Id. at 227. As a general rule, the bank, as
trustee, would not invest in mutual funds. Id. at 228.
90. Id. at 232-34.
91. Id. at 233-34. After creation of the trusts, the seller had no contact with the trustee,
who had absolute discretion over such issues as whether to sell the stock, when to sell, and
what to reinvest in. Id. at 236. These factors were found to be determinative. For a discussion
of Pityo, see Schnee, supra note 20, at 175-76. See also Coleman, supra note 10, at 1-2.
92. 70 T.C. at 237 n.6. One is left to wonder at the court's failure to address the "intent to
resell" analysis of Revenue Ruling 73-536. See the discussion in notes 15-19 and accompanying
text supra. Also absent is any reference to Revenue Ruling 77-414. Implicitly, the Pityo court
appears to have rejected the significance of pre-intended resales where the intermediary pur-
chaser is an independent trustee, the trustee is under no obligation to resell, any resale would
occur on the open-market (rather than to an ultimate purchaser identifiable at the time of the
sale to the trust), and the trustee is "at risk" during the interim period.
See also Fincke v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 510, 514 (1939), where a taxpayer's sale to a
trust at a price equal to his adjusted basis was not treated as a sham merely because the seller
intended the trust to resell the stock at a profit. The Pityo court also cited Nye v. United
States, 407 F. Supp. 1345 (M.D.N.C. 1975), to support its conclusion regarding installment
sales where the seller is aware of the purchaser's intention to resell on the open market. 70
T.C. at 236.
93. Id. at 237-38.
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Finally, the court addressed the issue of substantive purpose, a concern
first raised in the Wrenn decision. 9 4  The court experienced little difficulty
concluding that the trustee's independence, the economic risk it bore with
respect to corpus appreciation or depreciation, and its fiduciary duties to the
trust beneficiaries created numerous substantive purposes for the structure
of the transaction both from the perspective of the trust as well as the tax-
payer. 
5
Pityo was cited with approval in Roberts v. Commissioner. 96 On facts
nearly identical to those of Pityo, the Commissioner raised the same argu-
ments and was unsuccessful again. 97 As in Pityo, satisfaction of the Rushing
test was at the core of the controversy. The Commissioner objected to the
use of the Rushing control test in a case involving a trust used to effectuate
an open-market sale. The court, however, observed that the primary pur-
pose of the Rushing test, determination of the independent significance of
the intermediary, was the exact issue in controversy. 98 In the words of the
court, if the intermediary is an independent entity, "[tihe fact that the [tax-
payer] may have opted . . . to put the proceeds beyond his legal control
does not vitiate ... the transaction once it was consummated." 9 9
Turning to the issue of the independent significance of the trust, the court
identified various factors relevant to the inquiry. First, the court observed,
94. Id. at 239. Prior to Wrenn, the case law referred only to the economic reality test.
Transactions that are mere shams have never been given effect. See, e.g., Coleman, supra note
10, at 2; O'Hare, supra note 17, at 32-33; Tripp, supra note 43, at 263.
The exact scope of the substantive purpose test has yet to be fully outlined. In Wrenn v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. at 583-84, the court indicated that even a personal motivation could
suffice. The Tax Court elaborated on this concept in Roberts v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 324,
by noting that use of a trust to diversify holdings and effectuate a gift to one's children would
satisfy the substantive purpose doctrine. In Weaver v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 453-54, the
court recognized the use of a Rushing trust to effect a gift of an appreciating corpus to the
seller's children as a legitimate substantive purpose. One author has suggested that the substan-
tive purpose doctrine should be limited to sales between related parties. See Interspousal In-
stallment Sales, supra note 10, at 280-81.
95. 70 T.C. at 237-39. The court found ample support for the seller's claimed substantive
purpose to the form of the transaction. First, the seller needed to increase his cash flow. Sec-
ond, the transfer was a form of estate planning. Third, the transfer accomplished a shift of
appreciated assets to the seller's ultimate beneficiaries, his children. Id. at 234. From the trust's
side of the transaction, numerous other substantive purposes could be perceived by the court.
For example, for a fee, the trust could manage an appreciating corpus for the beneficiaries. In
addition, the trust was "at risk" both from the perspective of corpus appreciation and deprecia-
tion. Id. at 237-38. All of these factors contributed to the court's conclusion that the transaction
had economic reality. Id. at 239-40.
96. 71 T.C. 311 (1978) (appeal filed by the Government with the 9th Cir.)
97. Id. The seller funded an irrevocable trust with $2,500. The trustees were the seller's
brother and accountant. The taxpayer subsequently sold stock on the installment basis to the
trust for its fair market value. Id. at 313-21.
98. Id. at 323.
99. Id. The existence of a viable and independent trust was deemed sufficient to prevent
application of the substance over form doctrine. Id. at 322.
1979]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the trust was irrevocable and was a valid and distinct entity under state
law. 100 Second, despite the fact that family trustees were used, the court
accepted the taxpayer's evidence concerning their economic indepen-
dence. 10 1 Third, by possessing the sole authority over whether the stock
should be sold and, if so, when it should be sold, the trustees were un-
der no obligation to resell the stock. 10 2  The mere fact that a resale was
intended by the parties did not destroy the legitimacy of the original in-
stallment sale. Finally, the court noted, the absence of any security for the
trust's obligations left the seller as a "party at risk."' 0 3  Based upon these
facts, the court recognized the transaction as a legitimate installment sale.
Thus, installment sales to seller-created trusts have been treated more
favorably than installment sales to related parties. The two-part control or
economic benefit test of Rushing has emerged as the definitive standard in
the trust cases. The courts have consistently recognized the legitimacy of
installment sales to irrevocable trusts managed by independent trustees. It is
interesting to note that the courts have been unreceptive to the Commis-
sioner's reliance upon a prearranged, or intended, resale as the indicia of a
"sham" installment sale.10 4  Instead, the courts have demonstrated a wil-
lingness to look beyond such arrangements to the more fundamental issue of
trust independence. One of the indicia of such independence is the trustee's
ability to void such prearranged plans. In addition, the courts have relied
heavily upon the fiduciary's duty to act exclusively for the benefit of the
beneficiaries. The interaction of these two elements presents strong evidence
in support of a claim to independent, economic significance by any trust
entity. 105
In summary, numerous indicia of a bona fide sale to an independent trus-
tee may be culled from the precedents. The most important factors appear
100. Therefore, the taxpayer could not indirectly control trust investment policies. Id.
101. Citing Wrenn for the proposition that close familial relationships require close scrutiny,
the court concluded that the trustees were in fact independent. Id. See Comment, Related
Trustee May Be Used in Rushing-Type Trust, 150 J. TAx. 135 (1979).
102. Compare Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d at 598 (trustee could avoid § 337 liquida-
tion plan); Weaver v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 453-54 (trustee could avoid resale plan); and
Pityo v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. at 233-36 (trustees under no compulsion to resell) with Lustgar-
ten v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 303 (1978) (purchaser obligated to resell). In Roberts, the tax-
payer fully expected the stock to be resold, however, the prearrangement of a selling price
based upon an open-market value that could not be influenced by purchaser or seller was
deemed not to be fatal to the § 453 election. 71 T.C. at 322-23.
103. The language and analysis closely follows the "at risk" analysis that has been suggested
by one commentator. See O'Hare, supra note 17, at 33-34. At this point, the court raised the
issue of "substantive purpose." See notes 94-95 and accompanying text supra. Such reasons as
diversification of holdings and the transfer of assets producing a reinvestment return rate higher
than the interest rate on the installment notes was deemed sufficient in Roberts. 71 T.C. at 324.
104. See note 102 supra.
105. The best example of both of these elements may be found in Pityo v. Commissioner, 70
T.C. at 226. The Court expressly found that the trustee was under no duty or compulsion to
resell. Id. at 234. The seller expected the stock to be resold but was incapable of forcing the
trust to resell, and, for that matter, could not affect the resale price. Id. at 234-36. Finally, the
trustees had independent fiduciary duties running to the beneficiaries. Id. at 234.
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to be whether: 1) the trust is irrevocable;106 2) the seller has any power to
alter or amend the trust; 107 3) the seller is a beneficiary of the trust; 10 4)
the trustee is in fact independent (who controls or may control investments,
discretionary distributions, or sales of assets); 109 5) the trustee may void any
prearranged resale or liquidation; 110 6) the trust is subject to the economic
risk of appreciation or depreciation in the trust corpus (this supplies the
substantive purpose for the trust to enter into the transaction); 111 7) the
trust's obligations may be accelerated; 112 8) the seller is limited solely to the
installment obligations of the trust for investment recovery; 113 9) the
trust's obligations are secured; 114 10) the trustee owes fiduciary duties and
obligations to the trust beneficiaries; 115 11) the trust agreement is so restric-
tive with regard to principal and income distributions as to destroy the trus-
tee's independence; 116 and 12) the trustee is a close family member. 117
106. See Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d at 598 (irrevocable); Weaver v. Commissioner,
71 T.C. at 449 (irrevocable trust); Roberts v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 322 (irrevocable); Pityo
v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. at 235 (irrevocable). See also Galant, supra note 73, at 219-21; Car-
rou, supra note 10, at 114.
107. See Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d at 598 n.6 (settlor could remove trustee and
appoint a new corporate trustee); Weaver v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 447 (beneficiaries could
remove trustee); Roberts v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 322 (settlor had no power to remove
trustees); Pityo v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. at 229 (settlor could remove trustee and appoint a
new corporate trustee).
108. See Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d at 598; Weaver v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at
453-55; Pityo v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. at 238.
109. See Weaver v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 447, 454 (settlor could not be an investment
adviser); Roberts v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 322-23 (original plan was to reinvest in mutual
funds; however, the trustees chose to also invest in bonds and real estate); Pityo v. Commis-
sioner, 70 T.C. at 234-37 (settlor had no contract with trustee after creation of the trust).
110. See Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d at 598 (trustee could terminate § 337 liquida-
tion); Weaver v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 451, 454-55 (power to terminate the § 337 liquida-
tion); Roberts v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 323 (trustees had absolute discretion as to resales);
Pityo v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. at 238-39 (trustee chose investments independently). See also
Coleman, supra note 10, at 2; Galant, supra note 73, at 220-23; Schnee, supra note 20, at
175-77; Tripp, supra note 43, at 266-67.
111. See Weaver v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 453-55; Roberts v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at
323.
112. See note 61 supra.
113. See Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d at 598; Weaver v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at
452; Roberts v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 323-24; Pityo v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. at 236. See
also O'Hare, supra note 17, at 33-34 (seller must remain "at risk").
114. See Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d at 594-95 (notes secured by trust assets);
Weaver v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 447-48, 454 (no cash collateral); Roberts v. Commissioner,
71 T.C. at 323 (no collateral given). See also Garrou, supra note 10, at 114 (intermediary pur-
chaser should not pledge resale proceeds as security).
115. See Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d at 598; Weaver v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at
453-55; Pityo v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. at 238. See also Galant, supra note 73, at 220-23;
Garrou, supra note 10, at 113; Schnee, supra note 20, at 176.
116. See Weaver v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 453-54.
117. See Roberts v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 322 (brother and accountant of settlor-settlor
factually demonstrated their independence). See also Schnee, supra note 20, at 176-77.
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Conclusions
It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile a taxpayer's absolute right to
elect installment reporting under section 453 with the Service's continued
reliance on the constructive receipt doctrine in the context of an installment
sale to a related party. The authorities are clear that a taxpayer may refuse a
cash offer and negotiate an installment sale if desired.' 18 Therefore, the
constructive receipt doctrine appears to be less a mode of analysis than it is
a conclusory label invoked by the Service to characterize the result it desires
to reach. 119
If the constructive receipt doctrine is not the proper mechanism to tax
installment sellers on the full sales proceeds in the year of sale, what doc-
trine, if any, is appropriate? The answer appears to be the substance over
form doctrine. 120  Unfortunately, the case law precedents have confused the
substance over form and constructive receipt doctrines. References to both
doctrines appear in the cases without a clear indication which doctrine is
controlling. Courts have invoked the substance over form doctrine based on
the conclusion that the related party served as a mere agent. 121 Alterna-
tively, courts have combined the constructive receipt doctrine with the con-
clusion that the intermediary sale must be ignored. 122  The current state of
the law is confusing, at best.
In reality, the constructive receipt doctrine has no applicability at all to
installment sales involving related parties. If the substance of the sale com-
ports with its form, the taxpayer, as a matter of right, should be permit-
ted to report the gain on the installment method. If the sale does not with-
stand a substance over form attack, it is because either the related party or
the installment sale should be ignored. If the intermediary entity or the
intermediary installment sale must be ignored, it is difficult to perceive how
the taxpayer/seller can be in constructive receipt of the proceeds from either
such a sale or the equally fictional resale by the related party. If the inter-
118. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text supra. The presumption in all of these cases,
however, is that the installment sale is bona fide. See Ludlow v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 102,
107-08 (1961) (section 453 permitted despite purchaser's desire to pay cash). See also Solomon &
Kirkelie, supra note 84, at 669.
119. The Service routinely raises the constructive receipt argument whenever an installment
sale involves a trust or related party.
120. See Solomon & Kirkelie, supra note 84, at 827-35 (substance over form is the real
analysis). See also the most recent decisions involving trusts and related parties: Weaver v.
Commissioner, 71 T.C. 443 (1978) (appeal filed by the government with the 9th Cir.) (the
substance over form doctrine applied to a trust purchaser in the setting of a § 337 liquidation);
Roberts v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 311 (1978) (appeal filed by the government with the 9th Cir.)
(substance over form applied to a trust which resold on the open market); Wrenn v. Commissioner,
67 T.C. 576 (1976) (installment sale to spouse denied on grounds of substance over form).
121. See, e.g., Rushing v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1971) (mixture of substance
over form and constructive receipt); Nye v. United States, 407 F. Supp. 1345 (MD.N.C. 1975)
(substance over form analysis coupled with constructive receipt factors).
122. Mclnerney v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 665 (6th Cir. 1936) (constructive receipt).
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mediary party is to be ignored, nothing can be constructively received; thus,
no installment sale has occurred.
When an installment sale is not in substance what it purports to be in
form, the proper doctrine under which to tax the seller on the full sales
proceeds is the actual receipt doctrine.12 3  However, if actual receipt is the
proper result of a substance over form analysis, one must account for the fact
that the property has been transferred from the seller to the ultimate pur-
chaser for cash, not deferred payments. If one assumes that the purchaser has
acquired the property for cash, taxation of the seller on the full sales pro-
ceeds in the year of sale must be reconciled with the fact that the seller will
be receiving deferred payments from the related party. Finally, the neutral
tax impact on the related party must be explained.
One way to account for all of these results in a consistent fashion is to
treat the seller as having actually received the sales proceeds from the ulti-
mate purchaser and then deposited such proceeds with the related party. A
similar analysis was employed by the tax court in Pozzi v. Commissioner 124
and Lustgarten v. Commissioner. 125 The only difference between these two
decisions and the fact pattern postulated is that Pozzi and Lustgarten in-
volved escrows, not related parties. Because the same question of whether
the intermediary entity should be respected is involved in both instances,
the same analysis should hold true in both settings. 126 If this is the proper
method to analyze a related party installment sale, the planning factors out-
lined in the previous sections take on even greater significance. 127 Only if
an installment sale fails the substance over form test should the form of the
transaction be ignored. In any event, regardless of whether the intermediary
sale is or is not an installment sale or the intermediary party is or is not to
be ignored, the constructive receipt doctrine is inapplicable to installment
sales transactions involving related parties.
SENATE BILL 1063 AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
BILL 3899: A LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
In light of the current "all the facts and circumstances" test employed by
the courts in determining the legitimacy of installment sales between related
123. See Solomon & Kirkelie, supra note 84, at 833-35 (treat the seller as having actually re-
ceived the cash).
124. 49 T.C. 119 (1967).
125. 71 T.C. 303 (1978).
126. See note 84 supra. The escrow cases have relied almost exclusively on the constructive
receipt theory. Nevertheless, the substance over form concept seems to be the better analysis.
See Solomon & Kirkelie, supra note 84, at 788-90 (constructive receipt in the Pozzi setting is
erroneous-the better analysis is substance over form); Parker, supra note 84, at 349 (substance
over form, not economic benefit or constructive receipt, is the controlling doctrine). In both the
escrow and the related party cases, the real issue is whether the interposed entity should be
respected. Consequently, one finds the substantive purpose doctrine in the related party cases
performing the same function as the substantial limitation concept in the escrow cases. Both
doctrines serve to substantiate the independent existence of the intermediary. See note 84
supra.
127. See notes 55-61, 106-17, and accompanying text supra.
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parties, a legislative response now appears likely. On May 3, 1979, Senators
Dole and Long and Representatives Ullman and Conable proposed that
section 453(b) be amended to read as follows:
Subsection Does Not Apply to Disposition to Related Persons.-
(A) In General.-This subsection shall not apply to a disposition directly
or indirectly to a related person.
(B) Related Person Defined.-For purposes of this subsection, the term
"related person" means a person bearing a relationship to the person dis-
posing of the property which is set forth in section 267(b) or 707(b)(1).
(C) Exception For Certain Redemptions.-Subparagraph (A) shall not
apply to any redemption to which section 302(a) ...or section 303(a) ...
applies. 528
The preamble to the bill specifies that the abusive practice sought to be
eliminated by the amendment is the sale "of appreciated property on the
installment basis to a related party ...and then having the property sold by
the related party at little or no taxable gain because the cost basis for the
second sale would reflect the entire purchase price under the installment
sale." 129 In effect, the related parties would realize the entire gain in the
year of the installment sale but would defer reporting such gain by election
of the installment reporting method.
There is no doubt that the practice outlined in the bill may constitute an
abuse of the legislative intent behind, if not the express language of, section
453. The cases from Rushing through Weaver attest to the skepticism with
which such transactions have long been viewed. Nevertheless, it must be
questioned whether the proposed solution adequately remedies the per-
ceived abuse.
Senate bill 1063 and House of Representatives bill 3899 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as S. 1063) represent a case of legislative overkill. Immediate resales
are at the heart of the "abuse" identified in the introduction to the bills. 130
Nevertheless, section 453(b) as proposed makes no reference to resales. The
legislation indirectly remedies the resale problem by denying installment
sales reporting to any installment sale between related parties. Thus, regard-
128. See S. 1063, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1979); H.R. 3899, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
Hearings before the House Ways and Means Committee have been completed but not yet
published. See also Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management Gen-
erally of the Senate Finance Committee. 96th Cong., 1st Sess, (1979) [hereinafter referred to as
the Senate Hearing]. S. 1063 and H.R. 3899 are significant because, of the hundreds of tax
bills proposed annually, these bills have been sponsored by the chairmen and ranking minority
members of the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees.
129. See also Staff of Joint Committee on Taxation, Description of S. 1062 and S. 1063
Relating to Simplification of Certain Procedure and Administrative Provisions and Installment
Sale Reporting Rules Under the Internal Revenue Code 21-23 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Joint
Committee] (realization of full sales proceeds at the cost only of installment reporting); CONG.
REC. S.5,184 (daily ed. May 2, 1979).
130. Id.
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less of the absence of a resale, S. 1063 would deny a taxpayer the right to
report gain on a sale to a related party under section 453.
A second, and equally serious, flaw in the proposed amendment of section
453(b) arises from its incorporation of section 267(b) as the definition of "re-
lated party." 131 The fault with incorporating this definition lies in its over-
breadth. 132 The bill as presently drafted would deny installment reporting
treatment to legitimate installment sales of family-held business interests be-
tween related parties. A seller would no longer be able to retire by selling
an interest in the family business on the installment basis to a son or
brother. 133 Clearly, there is nothing in the prior case law to indicate that
installment reporting should be denied in such an instance.
131. I.R.C. § 267(b) defines a related party as follows:
RELATIONSHIPS.-The persons referred to in subsection (a) are
1. Members of a family, as defined in subsection (c)(4);
2. An individual and a corporation more than 50 percent in value of the outstand-
ing stock of which is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for such individual;
3. Two corporations more than 50 percent in value of the outstanding stock of
each of which is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for the same individual, if
either one of such corporations,. with respect to the taxable year of the corporation
preceding the date of the sale or exchange, was, under the law applicable to such
taxable year, a personal holding company or a foreign personal holding company;
4. A grantor and a fiduciary of any trust;
5. A fiduciary of a trust and a fiduciary of another trust, if the same person is a
grantor of both trusts;
6. A fiduciary of a trust and a beneficiary of such trust;
7. A fiduciary of a trust and a beneficiary of another trust, if the same person is a
grantor of both trusts;
8. A fiduciary of a trust and a corporation more than 50 percent in value of the
outstanding stock of which is owned, directly or indirectly, by or for the trust or by
or for a person who is a grantor of the trust; or
9. A person and an organization to which section 501 (relating to certain educa-
tion and charitable organizations which are exempt from tax) applies and which is
controlled directly or indirectly by such person or (if such person is an individual)
by members of the family of such individual.
CONSTRUCTIVE OWNERSHIP OF STOCK.-For purposes of determining, in
applying subsection (b), the ownership of stock-..
1. The family of an individual shall include only his brothers and sisters (whether
by the whole or half blood), spouse, ancestors, and lineal descendants....
132. Section 267(b) is certainly broad enough to cover all the cases discussed earlier in this
article. In fact, the only related party precedents beyond the scope of S. 1063 and § 267(b)
would be Oman Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1849-57, 1849-61 (1978)
(sale to an intermediary not related to the seller) and Rev. Rul. 77-414, 1977-2 C.B. 299 (sale to
a totally unrelated third party).
The breadth of S. 1063 in the area of related party installment sales seems anomalous in view
of the bill's failure to address escrow transactions. In view of Rev. Rul. 79-91, 1979-11 I.R.B. 9,
however, it is doubtful that a better legislative response could be drafted in the escrow area.
Revenue Ruling 79-91 provides the circumstances under which escrowed proceeds will be
treated as subject to a substantial limitation. See note 84 supra.
133. This was the major concern of the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. See Joint
Committee, supra note 129, at 28 where the report provides:
In dealing with potential abuses from related party installment sales, the bill
adopts a simple across-the-board denial of installment sale reporting for sales be-
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Recognizing these problems as major stumbling blocks to any legislative
response to the Nye-Rushing line of developments, the Staff of the Joint
Committee on Taxation has offered three alternatives. Each of these propos-
als is more focused and takes into account the nature of the property sold,
the presence or absence of a resale, and the nature of the relationship be-
tween the parties. As one alternative, the Joint Committee Staff has
suggested that a fixed resale period of two to three years from the date of
the installment sale be established. If the related party, as defined in section
267(b), resells the property within this period, the original seller will be
treated as having constructively disposed of the installment obligations
held. 134
Under the second alternative, the same moratorium period could be im-
plemented in conjunction with a bipartite classification of property. If the
property consists of marketable securities, any resale by the related party
would trigger a constructive disposition of the installment obligations held by
the taxpayer. In contrast, only resales by the related party during the two
year period immediately following the installment sale would trigger a con-
structive disposition of the installment obligations held by the taxpayer when
property other than marketable securities is in issue. 135 As a third alterna-
tive, installment reporting might be denied any taxpayer who sells market-
able securities to a related party. In the case of other types of property, the
two-year resale period of alternatives one and two would be adopted. 136
All of the alternatives suggested by the Staff of the Joint Committee rep-
resent an improvement over S. 1063 as currently drafted. By focusing on
sales to related parties and immediate resales, each of the alternatives repre-
sents a legislative response that is more finely tuned to the perceived
"abuse." 137  Unfortunately, even the Joint Committee Staff's proposals are
too broad. The real problem does not simply rest with resales by related
tween related parties. It may be argued that any restrictions should be limited to the
primary abuse situation where there is a resale by the related party installment
purchaser. This kind of limitation would be more complicated than an across-the-
board prohibition for installment sale reporting for sales between related parties
since tracing of the property sold would be necessary to determine if there had
been a disposition by the installment buyer. In addition, it would be necessary to
provide information reporting between the installment buyer and seller since ac-
tions by one taxpayer (the buyer) would have tax consequences for another taxpayer
(the seller). However, this approach would permit installment sale reporting for
situations where the purchaser is buying out the interest in a trade or business held
by a related party, e.g., a son making an installment purchase from his father of a
farm or other closely held business to be operated by the son.
See also Senate Hearings, supra note 128, at 49-50, 68-69, 75, 80, 128, 138-39, 143-46, 168-69,
191-93, 246 (many witnesses assailed the breadth of the § 267(b) rules in the setting of an
installment sale to a related party).
134. Joint Committee, supra note 129, at 28.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 29.
137. Id. See also note 133 supra.
[Vol. 29:47
SECTION 453
parties but rather with the presence of both of these factors when they are
coupled with an absence of any purpose for structuring the transaction in
such a fashion. In such circumstances, the only perceivable reason for choos-
ing this form would be to permit the seller to report on the installment
method when the purchaser is willing to pay only cash. It is difficult to
ascertain any purpose other than accommodating the original seller that
could motivate the related party to engage in such a transaction. 138 As
currently drafted, S. 1063 and the Joint Committee Staff's proposals fail to
limit their reach to such transactions. Instead, all resales, whether at a gain,
a loss, or at no gain or loss, are treated the same.
The inadequacies of all the alternatives are demonstrated by the following
example. Assume S owns marketable stocks with a basis of $50 and desires
to sell that stock on the installment method. Therefore, on January 1, 1979,
S sells the stock on the installment method to his brother, B, for $100, the
fair market value of the stock on that day. The value of the stock rises
dramatically and B sells the stock on the open-market on June 1, 1979, for
$130.
On these facts, S. 1063 would prohibit S from reporting his gain on the
installment method. Consequently, S would recognize fifty dollars of cap-
ital gain from the sale in 1979. The Joint Committee Staff's proposals
would treat B's sale of stock at a thirty dollar capital gain as a constructive
disposition by S of B's notes, similarly triggering fifty dollars of capital gain
for S in 1979. Under either proposal, B could then report his short-term
capital gain of $30 in 1979 or elect to report such gain on the installment
method. These results would follow despite the absence of any prearranged
resale by S or any intent on the part of S or B to resell the stock at the time
of the installment sale. Neither S. 1063 nor the Joint Committee Staff's
proposals take not account the possibility that B may have purchased the
property both to accommodate S as well as for his own personal invest-
ment.' 3 9  Each of the aforementioned proposals is simply too inflexible to
deal with this possibility.
Faced with the conclusion that none of these legislative solutions
adequately deals with the "abuses" of related party installment sales, three
alternatives remain. Despite its inadequacies, S. 1063 or one of the Joint
Committee Staff's proposals may be adopted. Such a decision could be jus-
138. Contra, Wrenn v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. at 584, where the court noted that any sub-
stantive purpose would suffice. The court took care to note that lack of a business purpose was
not the test. See notes 32 and 94 supra. It is not difficult to conceive of situations where the
related party may benefit from an installment sale followed by an immediate resale. The ques-
tion remains, however, of whether the seller should be permitted to benefit equally. Wrenn v.
Commissioner, 67 T.C. at 584, appears to take the position that an immediate resale is strong
evidence that accommodating the seller was the primary if not the only reason for the related
party's installment acquisition.
139. See notes 32 and 94 supra.
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tified on the basis that the benefits of administrative convenience and cer-
tainty outweigh any inequities inherent in the statutory framework. 140
As a second alternative, the present proposals could be modified. One
modification might be to shorten the Joint Committee Staff's two-year
moratorium period on resales to one year. Such an alternative would tie
together the concept of investment motive under section 453 with the hold-
ing period for long-term capital gain under section 1222. 141
A third alternative modification might be to graft an appreciation excep-
tion onto the two-year resale moratorium proposal. For example, if the
property sold to the related party were to appreciate more than twenty-five
percent over its adjusted basis in the hands of the related party, that party
would be permitted to resell the property without triggering a constructive
disposition of the installment obligations in the hands of the seller. 142 In
effect, satisfaction of the appreciation test would create a statutory presump-
tion of a substantive purpose for the installment sale.
Two problems are immediately apparent with this second proposed mod-
ification. First, it is difficult to reconcile the addition of another statutory
test under section 453 in the face of Congress' avowed goal of tax simplifica-
tion. 143 Moreover, it is even more difficult to justify creating one exclusion
to the two-year resale period when other equally deserving, but less codifi-
able, "substantive purposes" are ignored. 144
Perhaps the most logical manner in which to test the substance of a
transaction that is cast, in form, as an installment sale to a related party is to
examine each transaction on a case-by-case basis. This is the current position
of the law after twenty-five years of judicial and Service review. The courts
have done no better than to conclude that the legitimacy of an installment
140. The very reason for the language used in S. 1063 appears to have been motivated by a
desire for simplification. See CONG. REC. S.5,184 (daily ed. May 2, 1979), where Senator Long
states:
I am introducing today two bills that the staff has prepared pursuant to my in-
structions .... The second bill relates to the simplification and revision of the rules
for certain installment sales,
Mr. President, these bills would improve existing law relating to procedure and
installment sales by making simplifying changes and by eliminating several deficien-
cies.
Nevertheless, the Report of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation has indicated that S.
1063's simplification creates too great an inequity. See notes 130-38 and accompanying text
soupra.
141. See I.R.C. § 1222. This alternative may be operating from the erroneous presumption
that investment motive and one-year holding period are synonymous. It fails to consider that
the consequences under a modified form of S. 1063 might be so dire that investment has no-
thing to do with the taxpayer's holding of the property.
142. This concept would be analogous to the exceptions-to-the-exception structure of § 341.
See I.R.C. § 341.
143. See note 140 supra.
144. See notes 32 and 94 supra.
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sale involving a related party is dependent on "all the facts and cir-
cumstances" of each case. Congress' struggle to draft a legislative solution in
this area only reaffirms this conclusion.
CONCLUSION
A review of the case law involving installment sales to related parties re-
veals a vast array of misguided analyses and misleading verbiage. Neverthe-
less, the conclusions reached reflect one overriding element of consistency,
that is, a willingness on the part of the courts to examine each case on the
basis of its own particular facts. This method of analysis has produced a
laundry list of "do's" and "don'ts" for taxpayers selling on the installment
method to related parties. As a result, many of the inconsistencies in the
precedents may be explained on the basis of factual dissimilarities among the
cases.
With respect to the labels attached by the courts to their modes of
analyses, the constructive receipt doctrine seems misplaced. The most re-
cent decisions have avoided the constructive receipt language and have in-
stead focused on the substance over form argument. 145 The constructive
receipt and substance over form arguments often lead to similar conclusions,
but, from a theoretical standpoint, the latter is the only real tool of any
analytical value in this area. 146
145. See, e.g., Roberts v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. at 324; Oman Construction Co. v. Coin-
missioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1849-57 (1978).
146. See notes 118-27 and accompanying text supra.
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